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1 Introduction 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION, MOTIVATION  FOR 
THE RESEARCH, AND THE HISTORY OF LAND 
VALUE TAXATION 
The problematic nature of land ownership has been acknowledged for centuries. Already 
Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations noticed 
that: 
“The rent of the land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of 
the land, is naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to 
what the landlord may have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or 
to what he can afford to take; but to what the farmer can afford to give.” – 
Adam Smith (1776, p. 205) 
Also, the idea of solving or mitigating the problems of private land ownership by taxing 
this land value has been around since Adam Smith: 
“Ground-rents are a still more proper subject of taxation than the rent of 
houses. A tax upon ground-rents would not raise the rents of houses. It 
would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent, who acts always 
as a monopolist, and exacts the greatest rent which can be got for the use 
of his ground.” (Adam Smith 1776, p. 692) 
Actually, the term “land” is confusing in a number of ways. Firstly, classical economists 
and Georgist political economy used to word “land” to refer to all natural resources and 
anything else that has not been produced with human labor. This includes natural 
forests, game and fish populations, metal ore reserves, satellite orbits around the planet, 
and frequencies of the radio spectrum. 
The land value in real estate is quite a specific case of such non-producible resources. 
Secondly, even in this case, the concept of “land value” in the case of real estate 
misleadingly draws the attention to the ground. The land value we usually talk about in 
the case of real estate could more descriptively be called location value.  
This location value is not so much determined by soil quality or physical properties of the 
lot in question, but on what there is around this lot and how well the lot is connected to 
other areas. Natural geographic features play a part in this location value, but the 
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development of the local society and economy, the actions and investments of other 
people, are what matter the most for location value in an urbanized economy. (Foldvary 
2006, p. 4) The specific components of location value presented in more detail under “4 
Components of Location Value”. 
Essentially, location is much more comparable to other privileges, such as patents, taxi 
medallions, and academic degrees, than natural resources like fish and metal ore. 
Location essentially means access. It means access to certain markets, including job 
markets and private services, as well as local public services. The value of location 
depends very little of the owner of the specific piece of real estate. Anyone who wishes to 
participate in the labor market of a thriving metropolis has to pay rent for an apartment 
in the area, rent for a large part composed of the value of limited location. Anyone 
company that wishes to operate a business in such a productive urban economy needs to 
pay rent for the facilities the  
Similarly, a broadband internet connection provider with a local monopoly can charge its 
clients for all the services available on the internet. The price a holder of such a gate-
keeper resources is able to charge is not dependent on the quality of the services he 
provides or the costs of providing such a service, but (1) the perceived value of the 
services to which the service grants access and (2) the overall purchasing power of the 
clients. 
The more an economy develops and increases productivity in other resources (such as 
labor, energy, materials), the more people are willing to pay for access to limited, 
irreplaceable resources, and gatekeeper resources like land. Thus the market value of 
such resources and their meaning and power in the economy rises. 
Furthermore, as location does not decay and as it has no substitutes, it is essentially a 
perpetuity: it grants a constant, growing cash from now until eternity. Such perpetuities 
are extremely volatile to changes in (1) expected growth rates of the whole economy and 
hence rents, and (2) changes in the market interest rates on which the discount rates for 
such assets directly depend. This volatility increases at low interest rates. This valuation 
of real land is assessed in more detail under “6 Effects of LVT and Other Real Estate 
Taxes on Market Values”. 
Since Adam Smith, many economists have suggested and spoken for land value taxation. 
Researchers who don’t want to sound too radical often rather talk about “two-rate 
taxation” of real estate, which implies that buildings and other improvements are still 
taxed as well, but at a different (often lower) tax rate than the land value of the real 
estate. (Cohen & Coughlin 2005) 
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Henry George was one of the most famous advocates. His book Progress and Poverty, 
published first in 1879, was the best-selling economics book in its time. 
Other famous advocates include John Stuart Mill and David Ricardo. 
Even Milton Friedman, known as an advocate of minimal state intervention and taxation, 
called the land value tax “the least bad tax”. 
Today, many economists agree on the theoretical efficiency of land value taxation. 
However, it is not very frequently discussed when debating public policy. This might be 
partly due to interest-group-political factors. However, one major issue making land 
value taxation unpopular is the fact that, for example in the United States, many people 
consider the valuation methods used in determining taxable values to be unfair. (Cohen 
& Coughlin 2005) 
How such a tax is implemented is therefore crucial (a) for land value taxation to be 
implemented sustainably without it meeting immediate and widespread resistance and 
(b) for it to be able to achieve the benefits that theory predicts in practice (See section 2). 
E.g. 
- If taxable values do not correspond to the actual market values of real estate, the 
efficiency of the tax and its positive incentive effects are also reduced. 
- It is easy to accidentally leave room for corruption and other types of 
manipulation in the methods by which taxable values are assessed, hence 
increasing rather than decreasing rent-seeking opportunities. 
- Significant real estate taxes change how private investors value pieces of real 
estate. (See section 6) Sudden implementations of or changes in land value 
taxation can hence mean massive swings in real estate prices and hence 
constitute unjust windfall gains and losses to the private investors. 
- Uncertainty regarding the valuation models or changes in taxation can hold back 
real estate development. 
This thesis assesses the practical problems and economic risks involved in implementing 
land value taxation, and makes suggestions on how these can be mitigated and avoided 
by: 
1. designing efficient and objective ways to determine taxable value, and 
2. planning the roll out of the tax (including its timing) so that unpredictable swings in 
real estate prices are minimized. 
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2 Potential Benefits of Land Value 
Taxation 
2.1 A MORE EFFICIENT REAL ESTATE AND 
ACCOMMODATION MARKET 
The main arguments for the private, exclusive ownership of anything are the claims that 
it: 
- encourages people to take good care of things, and - it encourages keeping things in as productive use as possible. 
The trouble with the private, untaxed ownership of location is that it doesn’t lead to 
efficient use of locations. 
Location is one of those few asset types that can rise in value without any additional real 
investment in them, i.e., work done to improve them. As location essentially means 
access to certain markets and locally available services, the value of this access rises with 
the overall development of those markets, e.g. in productivity and versatility. 
Moreover, merely this expected rise in value of real estate can provide enough of a return 
to cover for the capital costs (that is, profit requirements) of owning that piece of land, 
especially under low interest rates. 
Real estate owners have in fact a significant incentive to underutilize their resources.  
Firstly, there are significant risks involved in leasing out an apartment or facility to a 
tenant. At low capital costs, it’s a safer investment to just possess high-end real estate. In 
China, there is even a widespread belief (or cultural attitude?) that the value of an 
apartment is eroded by people living in it. (CBS 2015) 
Secondly, a large real estate investor or a de facto cartelized construction sector can 
maintain higher revenues by purposefully sustaining an apartment deficit. (Salmela 2012) 
Accommodation has a fairly low price elasticity of demand, (WP-1) which means that 
people’s ability and willingness to pay for living in a certain metropolitan area does not 
fall very rapidly with the rise in rents. Therefore, keeping a few hundred more 
apartments empty in a city can significantly raise the rents that can be asked for the 
occupied apartments in that city. This applies even more so to office buildings. 
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For the accommodation and facility markets to work efficiently, there practically needs to 
be a cost to holding valuable locations. Imposing such a cost via LVT would make it very 
unprofitable to keep apartments and other facilities in central locations unoccupied. 
Urbanization has been a central force in increasing mankind’s overall productivity and in 
facilitating new innovations. The main mechanism is that bringing people closer together, 
i.e., increasing population density, allows (a) a more advanced division of labor and more 
complex kinds of economic cooperation, and (b) new collisions and interactions of ideas.  
Unnecessarily lowered population density decreases the efficiency and potential of the 
whole urban economy. A LVT acts practically as a Pigovian harms tax (WP-2) on the 
negative externalities of inefficient land use resulting from unoccupied apartments and 
underdeveloped real estate. 
2.2 DIMINISHING BUBBLES AND CREDIT 
CRISES 
Location is essentially a limited resource with no price elasticity of supply. Of course, the 
amount of valuable locations can increase in time. However, such valuable location 
cannot be produced directly by human effort. The value of a location increases 
depending on how surrounding areas are developed.  
As a price-inelastic resource with few substitutes, land essentially provides its owner 
with an infinite expected cash flow, i.e., a perpetuity. And in a developing city with 
expected net inflow of new inhabitants far into the future, we are usually talking about a 
growing perpetuity. 
As will be explained under 6, valuation of such a perpetuities are extremely volatile to: 
1. expected annual growth rates of the perpetuity 
2. expected long-term interest rates, which affect the discount rates. 
This is not the situation with producible production assets, such as machines and tools. 
As their supply has price elasticity, a momentarily rising valuation creates an incentive 
for producing more of such assets, which, in the long run, allows the profits yielded by 
such assets to fall down to the long-term expected discount rate, i.e., the expected profit 
required by investors. 
However, when the supply cannot increase, the income generated by an asset does not 
fall with discount rates. Instead, the valuation of the asset, in this case location, rises. 
Especially at low interest rates, even small changes in the interest rate or in the expected 
growth rate of rents can cause huge changes in the valuations of real estate. When an 
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economy is growing, a large part of the return expected by investors and homeowners for 
their investment is in the expected rise in the market value of their asset, not so much in 
the direct rental income or in the “accommodation services” the home provides for a 
homeowner. When the expected growth rate in rents and real estate prices even slows 
down, it real estate values easily collapse to “correct” for this change in expectations.  
This gives the real estate market its bubbling tendency. General macroeconomic cycles 
tend to be accompanied by significant booms and busts in the real estate market. 
(Foldvary 1991) 
As real estate is a significant kind of collateral for a lot credit in the economy – most 
notable mortgages taken by homeowners – a crash in real estate values usually also 
causes a credit crisis, which also puts the banking sector into a tight spot. Also private 
consumers are in a much worse position if, in addition to unemployment, they are facing 
a “negative equity” mortgage, i.e. a mortgage in which the principal of the loan exceeds 
the value of the piece of real estate used as collateral. 
The volatility of the real estate market and its current tight bond with the financial 
markets hence aggravates economic recessions and increases the amount of credit 
defaults in economic downturns. 
With high land value taxation, less of this volatile location value is in the hands of the 
private sector. This land value is practically “owned” by the public sector through the 
taxation. Hence, the public sector also carries a bigger part of the risks of its volatility. 
Actually, when land rent is mostly collected by the public sector the momentary 
valuation of this rent cash flow with current interest rates doesn’t even matter that much. 
It is only a problem when private agents need to constantly speculate on these valuations 
to make fair transactions and to determine how trustworthy a collateral such assets 
provide. 
As this valuation depends a lot on (a) general economic trends and structural changes 
between areas and (b) actions conducted by the state (such as zoning, infrastructure 
investments, monetary and fiscal policy etc.), the public sector can be argued to be the 
best party to carry these kinds of systemic risks in any case. 
A land value tax could be argued to both stabilize the overall macroeconomy and 
provide a more resilient financial sector. Of course, tax benefits and other public 
subsidies granted for mortgages and credit finance in general also play a big role in the 
fragility or robustness of credit markets. 
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2.3 NO DEADWEIGHT LOSSES AND REDUCED 
TRANSACTION TAXATION 
The main arguments heard in political and economic discourse for lowering taxation 
include the disincentives that transaction taxes (e.g. income taxes, VAT, capital income 
taxes etc.) impose on trade and productive investment. When there is an extra tax burden 
on buying something from someone else, many kinds of trade that might be mutually 
value-producing otherwise end up being left not worth doing. This kind of net loss of 
value is called a deadweight loss. 
As explained, the price elasticity of the supply of lucrative locations is zero. This means 
that an increase in price does not decrease the supplied amount. The existence of such 
locations is not dependent on the owner’s efforts. Any cost imposed on holding location 
is hence directly born by the holder. The holder cannot pass any of these costs on to users 
of the location by raising rents: When supply is inelastic the rents are directly determined 
by people’s willingness to pay for those existing quantities of the resources. Hence, rents 
are already as high as people are able and willing to pay. 
Therefore, a land value tax would not cause a deadweight loss similar to that imposed by 
transaction taxes. At least in theory, it should have no disincentivising effects on 
productive trade and real investments. Quit the contrary, it should increase the efficiency 
of the real estate market encouraging improvements and reducing underutilization of 
apartments and facilities in prime locations, as explained under subsection 2.1. 
Instead, a government deriving significant parts of its income from such taxes on location 
and other supply-inelastic resources (such as reserves of natural metal ores), allows it 
reduce inefficient and harmful taxes on trade significantly. This releases economic 
activity and development potential that is currently suppressed unnecessarily. 
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3 Challenges and Concerns with Land 
Value Taxation 
3.1 FAIRNESS OF VALUATIONS 
Probably the biggest challenge with land value taxation is fair assessment of the taxable 
land values of individual pieces of real estate. I will assess this issue thoroughly under “5 
Determining Location Value”. 
3.2 POLITICAL RISKS ON THE REAL ESTATE 
MARKET 
Another objection to land value taxation is that it allows affecting land prices (the market 
value of real estate) through politics. This is a major concern especially under currently 
prevailing interest-group-oriented politics focused on income and wealth transfers. 
Recurring, unpredictable adjustments in the tax affecting land values cause speculation 
and unfair windfall profits in the real estate market. This is a valid argument for keeping 
the land tax as constant as possible, and adjusting public revenues rather by changing 
other taxes (or e.g. paying surplus revenues back to citizens as a basic income or citizen’s 
dividend). 
Also, it is noteworthy that as long as the LVT remains at a level high enough to make 
hoarding land – holding it without using it for anything productive – clearly unprofitable 
(in which case the tax does not affect the amount supplied to productive use), then 
smaller changes in the land tax should not affect the tradable price of land even closely as 
much as bursting the current bubbles resulting from hoarding would. 
3.3 DEFENSES FOR REAL ESTATE 
SPECULATION 
Other “long-term objections” to land taxation are mainly ideological or based on some 
rather unrealistic assumptions. E.g. Murray N. Rothbard insists that any privately owned 
land being kept idle can only mean that it is waiting for more productive future uses due 
to high “change-over costs”: 
“The speculative site-owner is, then, performing a great service to 
consumers and to the market in not committing the land to a poorer 
productive use. By waiting to place the land in a superior productive use, 
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he is allocating the land to the uses most desired by the consumers.” 
(Rothbard 1962, p. 571) 
Rothbard insists that the landowner cannot reap unearned profits by keeping the land 
idle. 
“Even if a speculator reaps an ‘unearned increment’ of capital value by 
holding land as its price rises, he can gain no such increment by keeping 
land idle. Why shouldn’t he use the land and earn rents in addition to his 
capital gain? Idle land by itself cannot benefit him.” (Rothbard 1997, p. 
300) 
As Rothbard says, adjustments in market value keep land just as profitable an investment 
option as any other asset. 
“As a matter of fact, the landowner does not reap as much reward as the 
laborer from a progressing economy. For landowning is a business like 
any other, the return from which is regulated and minimized, in the long 
run, by competition. If land temporarily offers a higher rate of return, 
more people invest in it, thereby driving up its market price, or capital 
value, until the annual rate of return falls to the level of all other lines of 
business. The man who buys a site in mid-Manhattan now will earn no 
more than in any other business.” (Rothbard 1997, p. 300) 
With his rhetoric, like a magician, Rothbard flashes the income effect of the rise itself (the 
“capital gains”) in front of the reader’s eyes and immediately hides them into his sleeve. 
Rothbard also ignores the fact that a significant landowner has a local monopoly position 
and can gain higher total rents by keeping part of the land out of use, as explained in 
subsection 2.1. This alternative is the most profitable option for the site owner but by no 
means the most productive for the whole economy: While he reaps additional profits, he is 
imposing externality costs on the rest of the economy. 
3.4 PROBLEMS WITH A 100 % LAND RENT 
TAX 
Most of Rothbard’s valid criticism is directed at a 100 % tax on land rent. Leaving no 
return for location value to the landowner would leave him no incentive to optimize the 
use of the location.1 It would also be difficult to determine the value of land accurately 
                                                            
1 “He must also decide which use the land will best satisfy. In doing so, he also insures that each 
use is situated on its most productive location. A single tax would utterly destroy the market’s 
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and objectively when land value would not be notably reflected in market prices. These 
arguments don’t apply to a 5-15 % tax on land value (LVT), which still leaves the holder 
every incentive to find better uses for the location and to charge as much rent for the 
location as he can. An owner and developer of a larger area will also continue to have the 
incentive to take into consideration the effects of his activities on the development and 
value of the whole area. The difference between the effects of land rent taxation and land 
value taxation is discussed further in part 6. 
3.5 INTEREST-GROUP-POLITICAL OBSTACLES 
The biggest practical challenge in making the (democratic) decision to implement a land 
value tax is probably the political controversy and objection due to vested interests of real 
estate owners in sustaining current “real estate wealth”. Implementing such a tax – at 
least quickly – might cause “adverse wealth effects” to owners of significant amounts of 
land and real estate. (Cohen & Coughlin 2005, p. 360) These can be reduced by combining 
the implementation of a land value tax with certain monetary policy reforms or 
compensating real estate owners for their windfall loss in land value. This would 
effectively mean the public sector “buying” the land value from private real estate 
owners, as will be explained in part 7.3.  
We should also note that for a person who intends to live in her own apartment in the 
same region for the rest of her life, a drop in real estate prices is largely irrelevant: The 
losses in market value are never realized if you don’t sell your apartment. And if you sell 
it in order to change apartments within the region, a general drop in the real estate 
market doesn’t affect your ability to get a similar apartment in exchange for what you 
received selling the previous one. Actually, one of the only really valid reasons to own 
one’s own apartment – in the absence of tax benefits, subsidies and inevitably escalating 
land value – is hedging one’s living expenses. Buying a house with intent to live in the 
same area rest of your life is like “swapping” (in financial terms) your rent risk for an 
interest rate risk. (But in the absence of tax benefits, even for this end it would make more 
sense to invest in a diversified portfolio of local real estate through an investment fund.) 
If you have a large mortgage relative to the market value of you apartment (i.e., with low 
equity) and the drop in the market value of you apartment is sudden and significant, 
your bank might become concerned for the loss of collateral. Reducing the subsidies of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
important job of supplying efficient locations for all man’s productive activities, and the efficient 
use of available land. 
A 100 percent tax on rent would cause the capital value of all land to fall promptly to zero.” 
(Rothbard 1997, p. 297) 
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homeownership and credit finance would reduce the incentives for taking and granting 
such low-deposit mortgages. 
Another interest-group-political issue – at least in Finland – is “regional politics”. It can 
rightfully be speculated that many political instances want to maintain the high prices of 
housing in the Helsinki metropolitan area in order to deter immigration from the rest of 
the country. For some reason, Finns have a need to keep the whole country inhabited at 
any cost. Taking such an agenda for granted, let’s note that if the land tax went at least 
partly into state revenues – and not only into municipality revenues – the lower land 
taxes in smaller (and especially shrinking) municipalities would serve as a transfer 
payment to these regions. But otherwise (especially with our current environmental 
concerns) there are few valid justifications for subsidizing scattered living (a.k.a. sprawl) 
– and even fewer for deterring people from moving after work to allow structural 
adaptation between regions. 
3.6 CLAIMS OF COLLECTIVELY CREATED VALUE 
Some (libertarian) critics of LVT argue that land value is created by owners of 
surrounding real estate, and that it would hence be unfair to “punish” property owners 
collectively for this value creation. 
“The Georgist argument that property owners should have to pay for 
capitalizing on an externality they did not create (land) is refuted by the 
fact that the externalities are created every day by surrounding property 
owners and to punish them as a class is illogical.” (Peterson & Michie 
2014) 
However, the claim that landowners create land value is not valid. Even if some of those 
people that play a big role in raising land value would own a lot of land, the 
landownership isn’t the way that they raised it! 
Firstly, as said, public infrastructure investments and other public services play a big 
role.  
Secondly, private services are not all produced by landowners. Many service businesses 
that raise the value of residential buildings operate on leased premises. The positive 
externalities of the services provided are in no proportion to the entrepreneur’s financial 
position in real estate. 
One example is San Francisco. For the most part, San Francisco is made desirable by the 
Silicon Valley business ecosystem that generates highly innovative and scalable 
technology and online service companies and attracts lots of talented and hard-working 
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people as well as wealthy investors. The purchasing power that this cluster brings has 
further fed the emergence of a broad range of consumer services including restaurants 
and cafés. The presence of presumably intelligent entrepreneurs and their families also 
makes the city a highly desirable place for people to raise their children, which further 
increases the area’s competitiveness over businesses2 The prestigious Stanford University 
– a degree from which grants access to many high-paying labor markets – is another 
attractive feature, making people ready to pay for studying in the city. 
None of these factors are the makings of landowners or real estate developers. 
Of course, executives of successful companies are likely to become homeowners, as they 
have sufficient equity and income to get onto “the property ladder”. The university and 
some companies also own large amounts of real estate. But even they haven’t generated 
these positive externalities on land value with their landownership – or even their real 
estate development skills. Quite the contrary, land values in San Francisco are partly as 
high as they are precisely because zoning does not allow very much improvements and 
innovation in real estate development. (Avent 2014)This makes access to this desirable 
and productive community a limited resource for which landowners can charge high 
rents.  
The land value is the making of the community of people living and doing business in an 
area – not the ones who happen to own the real estate. Nevertheless, a large part of the 
economic benefits of the high productivity and innovativeness of the area has been 
reaped by local landlords, with no special effort or innovation of their own. 
 
                                                            
2 As Ed Glaeser says on this Freakonomics podcast:  
“The problem is that my welfare function depends critically on having people who are smarter 
than I am around me. And would need to make sure that my kids also had a lot of people who are 
smarter than they were around them.” (Dubner 2015) 
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4 Components of Location Value 
The market value of lots – undeveloped locations – is directly derived from the potential 
(future) uses available for that location and hence follow the market value of houses and 
other facilities. (Kanerva et al 1987, p. 34; Peltola & Väänänen 2007, p. 2) Theoretically, the 
only difference between these should be the construction costs.  
The market value of the whole piece of real estate can be derived from the rent that 
people are ready to pay for using it – just like the market value of any capital asset is the 
net present value of the cash flows it is expected to generate for the investor. The 
valuation equation for land is explained in more detail in “6 Effects of LVT and Other 
Real Estate Taxes on Market Values”. 
A major component of location value is proximity to, or, more accurately, the reachability 
of major urban centers. (Peltola & Väänänen 2007, p. 16) This does not only depend on 
direct geographic distance, but more on available transportation routes and services such 
as roads and public transport systems. In some simplified valuation models, rentees face 
a tradeoff between transportation costs, including travel time (which is also affected by 
traffic congestion), and rent costs. Hence, the rent they’re willing to pay increases as the 
travel costs and times to e.g. work and commercial centers drop. (Alonso 1964)  
Additionally, regions and areas can have more local properties that have an attractive or a 
repulsive effect. For example rivers, lakes and parks tend to be attractive features for 
residential properties, (Peltola & Väänänen 2007, p. 19) while the proximity of a major 
highway, an airport or other sources of noise, smell and pollution often have a repulsive 
affect. (Kanerva et al 1987, p. 34) Of course, the relative valuation of different locations 
(like anything in a market) is always very subjective and perceived, and also e.g. the 
“status” and reputation of certain regions is a significant factor. 
“Land”, or location, could also be categorized as a “privilege” instead of a natural 
resource because its value depends more on the collective productivity of the local 
society (and therefore people’s real income) than any pre-existing features of nature. 
As explained under 2.3, unlike buildings, location is extremely price-inelastic in supply. 
The potential to build in central locations can be increased by e.g. changing zoning to 
allow higher structures or different uses and although, in some cases, land can be 
extended into the sea or by digging rails and roads underground. Nevertheless, such 
decisions and the implementation of such projects seldom follow directly the market 
prices of real estate. (Such changes in the available amount are therefore not “price 
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elasticity”.) Therefore the market value of land (the location value of real estate) is largely 
determined by demand: what people and companies are willing and able to pay for 
living or operating in a region. 
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5 Determining Location Value 
The biggest (valid) concerns with and objections to real estate taxes are related to the 
fairness and reliability of the methods used to determine the value of real estate. Unfair 
practices and cases of corruption are the main factors making the real estate tax one of the 
most hated taxes in the U.S.. (Cohen & Coughlin 2005, p. 360) 
As land is seldom sold alone from underneath buildings, the value of the land (the 
location value of the real estate) is usually determined by subtracting the estimated value 
of improvements from the market price of the whole piece of real estate. In land value 
taxation or two-rate taxation of real estate, determining the value of improvements fairly 
and accurately is another challenge. 
E.g. Austrian economists Friedrich A. Hayek (1960, pp. 352-353) and Murray N. Rothbard 
emphasize the impossibility of any assessor to make a fair assessment of market value. 
“How will the annual tax on land be levied? In many cases, the same 
person owns both the site and the man-made improvement, and buys and 
sells both site and improvement together, in a single package. How, then, 
will the government be able to separate site value from improvement 
value? No doubt, the single taxers would hire an army of tax assessors. 
But assessment is purely an arbitrary act and cannot be anything else. And 
being under the control of politics, it becomes purely a political act as well. 
Value can only be determined in exchange on the market. It cannot be 
determined by outside observers.” (Rothbard 1997, p. 296) 
Here (for once) Rothbard has a valid point. Land value taxation has to be based on 
market information with as little room as possible left for the consideration of any 
assessor or other human judgment. This is also necessary to minimize corruption and 
regulatory capture. 
5.1 DETERMINING THE FULL MARKET VALUE 
OF REAL ESTATE 
5.1.1 Owner-Determined Value with 
Sale Obligation 
In Henry George’s model, the land valuation problem was solved by letting every owner 
value her own real estate and be required to sell it at that price to any willing buyer. 
(George 1912) In theory, this solution is almost perfect: Undervaluing one’s real estate 
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would increase the risk of losing that real estate and therefore such a valuation method 
would keep all land in the most valuable use available.  
In practice, two troubles here are the relatively high transaction costs of moving and the 
fact that people become emotionally attached to their apartments. A wealthy enemy 
could – out of pure malice or to gain leverage in another negotiation – buy you out of 
your house (or threaten to do so), even at a loss, as this would impose an even bigger 
subjective cost on you. I’ll call such offers “hostile offers”. 
Such fears could require some disliked or powerful people to pay ridiculously high taxes 
(beyond the actual market value) for their apartments only to avoid losing their family 
home or having to move all the time. The same applies to office premises and other 
business and industry facilities: Companies could conduct “hostile takeovers” of their 
competitors’ premises just to damage the competitors’ operations. 
5.1.2 Valuation Based on Binding 
Purchase Offers and Realized Deals 
The inverse model seems much more fair in practice: Instead of forcing owners to sell 
apartments or facilities to any willing buyer, it would be more humane to adjust 
valuations according to any outstanding offers on apartments and oblige the highest 
bidder to buy if the seller agrees to sell at the offered price.  
5.1.3 Statistical Methods 
However, similarly as with owner-determined value, valuing each individual piece of 
real estate based on offers made on that piece of real estate only, leaves the possibility of 
hostile offers: If person A has an emotional attachment to his/her apartment, then person 
B who has lots of money and/or much to gain in persuading person A in some way 
could make a high value offer on person A’s apartment, effectively raising person A’s 
real estate taxes or forcing him/her to sell the apartment to person B, a hostile party. 
Using the resulting offers on all similar apartments in the same area, a statistical average 
could be set to determine a minimum and maximum amount for the actual taxable value 
of individual apartments – eliminating the effect of “hostile offers” and possible brand 
value of certain buildings (see section 5.2.5).  
The value of a lot is largely dependent on (a) the attractiveness of the location (see part 4) 
and (b) what kinds of uses its zoning allows. Therefore, any real estate transactions and 
outstanding offers in an area can be used to readjust the value of all real estate in that 
area. If there happen to be unbuilt lots in the area, the offers out on these give a good 
reference point for the value of other land, but even in their absence, algorithms can be 
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used to determine the prices of hypothetical unbuilt lots of different building rights based 
on the prices of different kinds of real estate developments in the area.  
Of course, this leaves the challenge of determining the value ratio between apartments 
e.g. facing different directions and on different floors in the same building. Penthouses 
and seaside apartments tend to be valued much higher than ground floor apartments – 
and such valuation differences are of course very subjective and possibly volatile. 
On the other hand, in a market where homeownership isn’t unnecessarily subsidized 
with any tax benefits compared to living on rent (as it now is in many countries), a 
majority of real estate would likely be owned by investment companies and funds (rather 
than the occupants). The competition between these over the most profitable pieces of 
real estate would likely provide a far more versatile and regularly updated range of 
offers on all real estate on the market, making market values follow rental prices much 
more closely. In this situation, it would likely be whole apartment buildings (or fungible 
shares in them) that are traded, instead of individual apartments, reducing the problem 
with valuing apartments on different floors and facing different directions.  
In the case of apartment units owned by inhabitants or other different parties, splitting 
the land value tax burden between owners of different apartments would be done 
according to the rules of the housing company. The housing company has every 
incentive to keep these rules fair in order to be able to buy willing buyers for the 
apartment shares. 
5.1.4 Impartial Expert Valuation 
One alternative is to have a dedicated agency determining the value of all real estate. 
The biggest challenge here is that such valuations can be disputed, and there are likely to 
be many complaints and disputes if there is any chance of lowering one’s land value 
taxes by disputing them. 
There are also a notable risks of corruption or some kind of favoritism. If the valuation 
criteria aren’t market-based or somehow clearly objective, there is room for significant 
gain in giving an acquaintance’s buildings a higher valuation. 
Additionally, there are significant costs to such a completely independent valuation 
agency – especially if there are double or triple checks to reduce risks of malpractice. 
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5.2 DETERMINING THE VALUE OF 
IMPROVEMENTS 
In addition to being able to determine (a) a fair market value for the whole piece of real 
estate, determining the land value requires assessing (b) the value of improvements (and 
other increases in value created by the owner). Land value is the difference between the 
two. 
5.2.1 Reported Construction Costs 
The value of improvements is also often referred to as “replacement costs” of the 
buildings. This approach assumes a kind of cost-based valuation. In this case, the value of 
new buildings would be their construction expenses. 
To find out the current replacement costs for older buildings, historical construction and 
renovation expenses need to be adjusted with time according to (1) changes in the 
construction cost index, which is affected by productivity development and changes in 
the price of construction work and materials, as well as (2) the deterioration/depreciation 
of the building. 
Now, the easy way to find out the construction costs of buildings would be to use what 
the construction company has reported to have spent on the building. However, there is 
a notable incentive trap especially when the construction contractor is also the owner of 
the real estate or involved in other business relations with the owner. The constructor has 
every incentive to exaggerate the construction costs involved and include in them as 
much of its overhead costs (and of the costs of other businesses it might have) as possible 
to make it seem as if a bigger part of the value of the developed real estate is the result of 
development – in order to make the piece of real estate cheaper to hold for potential 
buyers. 
Secondly, using construction expenses for valuation would encourage inefficient 
construction. Achieving high labor productivity in a construction project would be 
penalized as higher land value taxes: The land value would be perceived to be higher, 
even though, in reality, the construction company has just achieved a more valuable 
building for lower costs. 
The same problems apply to renovation work. There is as significant incentive to 
exaggerate the costs of renovation work. 
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5.2.2 Insurance Values 
Another private source of building valuations would be insurance companies. Home 
insurers should, in principle, only value and cover for the buildings, as the location value 
of the real estate isn’t destroyed when an individual building burns down or is flooded.  
However, nothing prevents insurers from insuring assets for more than their actual 
replacement cost (as e.g. some car insurers tend to do). If they do so, they also have to 
charge higher insurance payments to keep their business profitable. If replacement costs 
were purely determined by insured values, it might be profitable for homeowners and 
real estate investors to pay higher insurance fees in order to avoid land value taxes: The 
insurance payments are far lower than an effective location tax rate (in the range of 5-15 
%, see section 7.1). Therefore, blindly trusting the figures given by individual home 
insurers is not a bulletproof solution either.  
5.2.3 Impartial Expert Valuation 
As with the value of the real estate in general (see subsection 5.1.4), one alternative is to 
have a dedicated agency determining the value of buildings irrespective of the reports of 
construction companies or insurance decisions. Many companies develop such valuation 
models. For example the Finnish Haahtela Yhtiöt is developed advanced methods for 
taking qualitative factors of buildings into account. 
The biggest challenge here, too, is that such valuations can be disputed and that there are 
notable risks of corruption or kinds of favoritism, as well as the costs involved. 
5.2.4 Statistical Methods 
If homeownership weren’t subsidized compared to living on rent and we had an efficient 
real estate market with real estate investors constantly having offers open on most 
properties, one solution would be to use the relative changes in these prices to determine 
the effect that a renovation project or greenfield real estate development project had on 
the value of a piece of real estate. This would not reward inefficiency in construction 
work and would not be as subject to corruption, as there would be less reliance on 
individual human judgment. 
The market prices (depending on outstanding offers, see subsections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3) 
before and after the development would be compared and controlled for changes in the 
market price of similar, undeveloped real estate in the region. The rise in the value of 
these pieces of real estate would serve to indicate how much of the increase in value of 
the developed apartment was the result of the rise in location value and how much due 
to the real investment. Any previously empty lots or lots with buildings planned to be 
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razed off them (for e.g. redevelopment) could be subjected to an open auction, allowing 
for “recalibration” of land values in the area. 
5.2.5 The Challenge with Brand Value 
But is there value other than location value that a building can gain without physical 
construction and renovation? Unfortunately yes: brand value. This is likely the most 
difficult kind of value to discern in the case of individual pieces of real estate. 
Accommodation and office buildings can gain a status and reputation, which increase the 
rents that occupants are willing to pay for them, but the problem is even more salient in 
developments made for special purposes and where the service provided is strongly 
dependent on the specific piece of real estate. Say, for example, that you build a spa (or 
theme park or casino etc.) almost in the middle of nowhere. You might pay next to 
nothing for the lot and then invest $10M in building the spa. Others might consider this a 
risky investment and no one would make any offers on the spa for more than $9M. Thus 
the LVT for the real estate would be $0 (as its land value, market value minus 
construction costs, is negative). But with a $1M investment in marketing during a year 
(with no further construction), the spa might become very popular among wealthy 
people and start generating high profits.  
As the spa business is strongly dependent on the specific piece of real estate, competitors 
or other investors could practically take over the business by simply buying the real estate 
from you. (Of course, they might have to rehire the personnel, but that could be a less 
critical added value factor or competitive advantage than the physical spa itself.) Hence, 
offers on the spa might rise to $25M. This added value of $14M is not location value 
created as a “positive externality” by the surrounding community, as the spa is still 
located “in the middle of nowhere”. It is brand value built by the spa owner. It makes 
little sense to charge the spa owner an LVT for the $15M by which the market value of 
the spa building exceeds the increase in value during construction. The possibility of 
such penalization would harmfully disincentivize the marketing of any businesses or real 
estate and hence many kinds of productive real investment. 
The above case example (together with the possibility of “hostile offers”) emphasizes the 
importance of statistical methods and comparisons with surrounding lots in determining 
how much of any increase in the price of a piece of real estate is actually location value. 
In the case of the spa, the price of an adjacent lot would not have changed even remotely 
as much because of the business potential in the spa itself, which would show that the 
increase is not a matter of location.  
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Of course, as explained in section 4, the reputation – “brand” – of a whole region might 
increase, but this can be considered location value. Such a status is seldom caused purely 
by an individual development. When a developer can expect his investments to raise the 
value of adjacent land (e.g. when Disney constructs Disney World), it is probably worth it 
for him to buy up a larger area of land before making the investment decision and then, 
after his investment decision, sell off at a higher price the bits he does not intend to 
develop himself. A 10 % LVT would still leave almost half of any land value (and 
increase thereof) to the owner, but make it unprofitable to keep it out of productive use 
for a longer time. 
To sum up, land value should not be determined purely based on the market price of the 
individual piece of real estate, but as a weighted average of (or using another algorithm 
taking in) the highest offers on similarly zoned pieces of real estate in the same region – 
making considerations for special attraction features (e.g. a river, a beach or exceptionally 
good views). This would maintain the incentive of any individual developer and investor 
to maximize the market value of their own real estate, regardless of the means. 
But these are only the best options this book comes up with. Land valuation (and the 
details of LVT in general) is surely an area in economics where lots of (pun intended) 
creative solutions and innovation is necessary. Competing governance forms – e.g. 
charter cities or mostly autonomous states within federations – could allow 
experimenting on different alternatives and letting people choose the ones they consider 
most fair. 
As Friedrich Hayek notes, the biggest challenge with land value taxation is the difficulty 
“to distinguish clearly between the value of ‘the permanent and indestructible powers of 
the soil,’ on the one hand, and, on the other, the value due to the two different kinds of 
improvements – that due to communal efforts and that due to the efforts of the 
individual owner”. (Hayek 1960, pp. 352-353) However, it is not necessary to distinguish 
between value resulting from public investments and value resulting from general 
economic development (or the “powers of the soil”), as long as public investments are 
approximately known before the land is sold to any private developers. The biggest 
challenge is in determining the value created by the real estate owners’ own development 
efforts. 
In any case, changes in both municipal investment plans and zoning can cause both 
windfall profits and losses to real estate owners – and they can do even more so in the 
current situation with no significant land value taxes. This is why zoning and public 
investment plans need to be predictable and there should be a system for compensating 
and charging for land value impacts of changes made to the plans. 
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6 Effects of LVT and Other Real Estate 
Taxes on Market Values 
6.1 LAND VALUE TAXATION 
Would e.g. a 20 % annual land value tax (LVT) make it impossible for land ownership to 
be profitable? No, because land values adjust according to the tax. An LVT can 
theoretically be more than 100 % annually of market value, as will be explained below. 
In general, an asset expected to produce an annual cash flow of P to infinity – a perpetuity 
– can be valued with the formula: 
 
where r is the profit requirement (discounting interest rate) of the invested capital.3 
Here we can see, why land value taxation is essential for a working economy. Land 
(location) doesn’t decay like other real assets and it cannot be produced more of so that 
the increased supply could reduce the revenues it generates below its production costs 
(which it doesn’t have). Therefore, with negative market interest rates (causing 
discounting interest rates to drop close to zero), the value of untaxed land is theoretically 
infinite! No wonder low interest rates are blamed for real estate bubbles. Actually, it just 
escalates the bubble that is already there. 
An asset that is taxed annually according to its market value has to produce the tax rate 
(t) in addition to its profit requirement to the owner (r) in order to be profitable. Hence: 
 
 
If we expect the demand for land – i.e. the price people are willing to pay for the use of 
location – to grow annually at a steady rate (with e.g. rising real income), then the value 
of land would be 
                                                            
3 You can understand this in two ways. Firstly, r is practically the profit the asset needs to make 
annually for holding it to remain profitable, and hence Vr = P. Alternatively, calculating and 
adding up the net present values of each year’s cash flow gives you the series (sum of an infinite 
number of terms) Pn/(1+r)n, which is P0/r. 
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where dP is the expected annual growth rate in the yield of the asset and P1 is the current 
yield of the location.4  
So, assuming fairly steady demand for land (the real rents people are willing to pay for 
accommodation and companies for their facilities) in the future, if you tax land 10 % of 
land value in a situation where the discounting rate for real estate investments is around 
5 %, the market value of land would drop to a third. Effectively, the state is reclaiming 
two-thirds of the ownership – more precisely “right to the income” (See section 6.3, 
Honoré 1987) – of all land. As John Stuart Mill put it in 1848: 
“The whole of [the land-tax], therefore, is not taxation, but a rent-charge, 
and is as if the state had retained, not a portion of the rent, but a portion of 
the land. It is no more a burthen on the landlord, than the share of one 
joint tenant is a burthen on the other.” (Mill 1848, Book 5, Ch. 2, Sec. 6) 
But this of course assumes that both P and r remain constant. The demand curve for land 
should not shift only because such a land tax is implemented, as it should not change 
what people are willing and able to pay for a central location – or living in general.5 
However, if land taxation reduces the need for other taxes, it is possible that the 
increased purchasing power would make people ready to pay more for the location of 
their accommodation, increasing P. 
On the other hand, landowners also currently expect land values to continue rising – not 
just to yield rents – and e.g. in the Helsinki metropolitan area, land prices are currently 
held on a rising path mainly by the construction cartel restricting supply. Therefore, 
when land taxes are first implemented, more lots are likely to become available for 
construction, increasing the supply of apartments and reducing speculative investment 
demand of real estate. This would, firstly, burst the bubble (“diamond bubble”) 
maintained by the housing deficit and, secondly, would also reduce the expectations of 
real estate prices rising in the future, which means that rents have to cover for a bigger 
part of the return requirement (r) set for the investment. If we consider P to mean rents 
only, it raises r. It is therefore possible that implementing such a tax would initially cause 
                                                            
4 This is a direct application of the formula for the present value of a steadily growing perpetuity: 
PV = D1/(r – g) (FF-1)  
5 “Nor, if a tax be levied on that rent or value, this in no wise adds to the willingness of anyone to 
pay more for the land than before; nor does it in any way add to the ability of the owner to demand 
more.” (George 1887) 
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real estate prices to come down much more than the previously presented equation 
predicts. 
Essentially the LVT rate determines how many years’ cash flow (including the profits 
derived from a possible sale) the market price of land will be. With an LVT rate of 100 %, 
the value will be a little (depending on the discount interest rate) less than one year’s 
profits, with 50 % a little less than two years’ profits, with 25 % a little less than four 
years’ profits and with 200 % a little less than half a years’ profits.  
On the other hand, we must remember that the value of apartments and buildings are not 
all land value, but also include the value of the buildings, their replacement costs, for 
which there is no additional tax. If, without LVT, the price of an apartment is half 
construction cost and half location value, then a 10 % land value tax, eating away 50-66 % 
of the location value (with a 5-10 % discount rate), would “only” cause real estate values 
to drop around 25-33 %, assuming no change in supply. 
Because land taxation significantly affects the market prices of real estate, unpredictable 
changes in land taxation are effectively massive transfers of wealth – not merely income 
transfers. It is therefore important to implement land taxation gradually, predictably and 
credibly, so that the effects on land value occur more as halting the constant rise in real 
estate value than as a sudden crash. This will be discussed further in section 7.3. 
In this perspective, it can be considered a very ingenious political maneuver to make the 
majority of the population incumbent landowners by implementing subsidies that make 
homeownership more profitable compared to living on rent – and that make high-
leverage mortgages more accessible. 
“Another problem on the political front was that home ownership was so 
widespread in America that most families and businesses wanted the land 
value of their property for themselves.” (Hudson 2008, p. 11) 
E.g. in Finland there are multiple direct and indirect subsidies that make homeownership 
very lucrative. When most voters have something to lose in implementing land taxation, 
such suggestions are not going to be suggested by any major parties, no matter how well 
one would manage to explain the perverse situation in the construction and real estate 
markets: how the Finnish “real estate wealth” rests on an artificial apartment deficit and 
public accommodation support and practically forms a massive income transfer system 
from all rent payers and taxpayers to owners of real estate. 
To explain why it is a very damaging public policy objective to maintain or maximize the 
market value of any existing type of assets, we could consider almost any other asset on 
the market. What if, in the mid 90s, the government had become concerned for the 
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market value of the investments in IT (information technology) that people and 
companies had made – “the Finnish computer wealth” – and had wanted to prevent the 
market value of all the computers equipped with Pentium and 486 processors from 
dropping? It would’ve implemented measures to prevent technological progress and 
restrict supply to maintain computer deficits that ensure that few people can afford new 
computers and that most of them have to buy second hand ones instead. We would now 
be stuck with those same CRT screens and 60 MHz processors. Allowing and facilitating 
investments into the development of the real quality of goods – e.g. as upgrades and better 
substitutes – and more efficient production processes requires letting the market value of 
older, obsolete assets fall. 
The political challenge is similar to that with implementing carbon taxes: Companies – 
and thereby investment and pension funds – have significant sums invested in already 
found and accessed oil reserves and the decision to tax fossil fuels out of use would 
annihilate a lot of the value of those investments, which are currently in their balance 
sheets and capitalized in their stock prices. But as long as such sufficiently brutal carbon 
taxation is postponed, new and increasing investments into searching for new fossil fuel 
reserves and developing new technologies to access them will be made. Similarly, as long 
as land is not taxed, rents and land values will keep rising – the diamond bubble blowing 
up – due to both the growth of cities and speculative hoarding resulting in inefficient 
land use – constantly increasing the too-big-to-fail dilemma in the real estate market and 
raising the political threshold to start taxing land. And the solution to both cases is also 
similar: a gradual but credibly decisive and predictable implementation plan or raising 
land value taxes simultaneously with implementing other changes that will likely raise 
real estate prices (as will be discussed further in section 7.3). 
So what would be an optimal, final long-term rate of land taxation?  
The main purpose of land taxation was to ensure that holding land without using it for 
the most productive use available remains unprofitable and thereby prevent speculative 
hoarding and real estate bubbles. A minimum requirement for this is that the value of 
land according to the equation 
 
does not turn infinite. If it did, then also any terminal value after any time of holding is 
infinite, offsetting any finite costs of holding the land unused until then. Therefore we 
have to make sure that in all market conditions 
t > dP-r  
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The long run demand curve for land in central locations (and hence the profits that can 
be made on land, P) can be expected to rise as general labor productivity and thereby 
living standards rise. If we assume a constant portion of income that people want to 
spend on the location of their accommodation, then the demand curve would rise at the 
same rate with the general real income level. However, if people have little additional 
material needs (the income elasticity of the demand for location is relatively high), the 
demand for location might rise even faster. Hypothetically, if we’d need the possibility of 
real interest rates to go down to at least to -6 % and assuming fairly low risk premiums 
on real estate (when the market is not speculative) of 3 %, the discounting interest rate 
could get as low as -3 %. If we add an expected 2 % annual productivity increase (and 
assume an equal increase in the amount of money that consumers and companies are 
willing to pay for good locations) to that, we get 5 % as an absolute minimum annual 
land tax. The “Real Estate 4 Ransom”, documentary by Prosper Australia arrives at 
suggesting a 6 % LVT although it does not present the calculations by which this figure 
arises. (Emmanuel & Fitzgerald 2012) 
For a large construction company, it might be profitable to make a small loss on holding 
its lot portfolio in order to be able to control market prices and block competition from 
capturing market share. (Salmela 2012) But as the losses get bigger with higher LVT rates, 
it becomes a game-theoretically bad strategy to hold bigger portfolios than competition 
does. Therefore, maintaining an apartment deficit would require an actual cartel that 
agrees not to sell lots to new entrant construction companies and where the costs of 
holding excess lots are shared. It would no longer be a profitable strategy for an 
individual company to hang on to lots just to guarantee future market share. Especially if 
municipal zoning is slow-paced and lagging behind demand (meaning that small 
portfolios of unbuilt lots are enough to control prices), a tax higher than 10 % might be 
necessary.  
Also, t + r - dP getting even close to 0 causes speculative volatility in land prices. So, the 
higher the land tax rate, the less speculative in nature and less sensitive to interest rate 
changes the real estate market will be (in the steady state, after LVT has been rolled out).  
6.2 RENTAL VALUE TAXATION 
Let’s point out the difference between (1) land value taxation according to the market 
value of land, as explained above, and (2) rental value taxation. For example Singapore and 
Hong Kong currently tax real estate according to annual rental value: how much it can 
yield rent in a year. The effect of such a rental value tax (tr) on land value is very 
different: 
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With positive discount rates, the effect of rental value taxation on land values is more 
linear. Market values should drop directly in proportion to the tax rate (a 20 % tax should 
drop land values by 20 %). Like land value taxation, rental value taxation can reduce land 
speculation and increase land use efficiency by making it less profitable to hold land 
unused. But we can see how a rental value tax below 100 % cannot turn the rent yield of a 
land investment negative for the owner, as a land value tax could. V would still approach 
infinity when r approaches 0. Therefore, with low interest rates, real estate would be just 
as bubbly and volatile with land rent taxation than without it – only with smaller 
absolute values.  
Also, determining the rental value for owner-occupied buildings is not that 
straightforward. Singapore uses a capitalization rate (r) of 5 % as a rule, but interest rates 
can change and, even with constant interest rates, the profit requirements are always 
subjective for every investor and can vary for buildings in different areas and for types of 
real estate (e.g. according to how volatile the demand in an area or for the type of real 
estate in question is perceived to be). In an efficient real estate market (with equal tax 
treatment for rental living and homeownership), market information for the price of the 
whole real estate can be more readily available, regardless of occupant. (See section 7.2) 
6.3 PUBLICLY OWNED, RENTED LOTS 
Another suggested solution to the monopoly nature of land would be simply to remove 
private land ownership altogether: The government or municipality would own all land 
and lease to homeowners, real estate developers or investors. E.g. Silvio Gesell proposed 
full state ownership of all land (“freiland”, Gesell 1916, Part 2) 
The difference between this and higher land taxation is notable, but not dramatic – in 
theory. Looking back at Tony Honoré’s classification of rights included in ownership: 
1) the right to possess 
2) the right to use 
3) the right to manage 
4) the right to the income of the thing 
5) the right to the capital 
6) the right to security 
7) the right of transmissability 
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8) the right of absence of term 
9) the duty to prevent harm  
10) liability to execution and  
11) the incident of residuarity. (Honoré 1987) 
In a switch to the lease model from very highly taxed ownership, private users of land 
would lose their rights to “transmissibility”, of “absences of term” and of “residuarity”. 
The “rights to use”, “to manage” and “to the income of the thing” would not change 
much. 
In practice, however, leasing land without the buildings is very problematic. If buildings 
could be costlessly teleported from one place to another (or if they could “lift off” and 
land again in other places like some Terran buildings can in the real time strategy game 
Starcraft), we could have a very efficient land-lease-based real estate market and an 
urban structure that constantly evolves to suit the demands of its citizens and businesses. 
But, in reality, moving real estate developments is seldom feasible.  
If a private investment company owns the land on which you’ve built a house (or holds 
the lease from the government for it), what limits how much the investment company can 
charge rent from you? As you cannot move your house anywhere else and the 
construction costs are sunk costs, the (monopolist) lessor would be in a position to rob 
you of all of the capital of your house (the income it can generate), simply by raising the 
rent on the land to what anyone would be willing to pay to live in the house. This, 
together with the ability of anyone to buy (or lease from the government) land from 
“underneath” any building would kill the incentives for all real estate development (for 
anyone not owning the land as well). 
Also Silvio Gesell emphasized the importance of the leaseholder having assurance that 
his lease won’t be cancelled, so that he dares invest in improvements on the land. As one 
solution to this issue and the incentive for leaseholders to “impoverish the soil”6 he 
suggested making the lease lifelong. 
“After the land has been nationalised it will be divided according to 
requirements of agriculture, housing and industry, and leased by public 
auction, for terms of 1, 5, 10 years, or for life, to the highest bidders.” … 
“But in any case exhaustion of the soil by the tenants can easily be 
                                                            
6 “Leasehold tenure has been objected to on the ground that the tenants will be more inclined to 
impoverish the soil than the present owners who are personally interested in keeping the soil in 
good condition. The leaseholder, it is said, squeezes everything out of the soil and then moves on.” 
(Gesell 1916, Part 2, Ch. 3) 
 34 
prevented. The tenant can be given a lease of his farm for life.” (Gesell 
1916, Part 2, Ch. 3) 
How could the lease on the land possibly follow a fair market price with such fixed 
leases? Also in reality, governments or municipalities own lots and lease them to 
homeowners, real estate developers or condominiums. E.g. in Hong Kong, the Chinese 
government officially owns all land, but lease periods are relatively long and have fixed 
rents,(CLIC 2013) and hence the costs to the leaseholders don’t follow the market value of 
the location. The owners of the real estate still receive the gains from increases in location 
value. The leaseholders or apartment share owners in condominiums (if the 
condominium has a direct lease from the government) end up being the de facto 
landowners. And setting such public leases of land leave lots of room for corruption and 
bias. 
Gesell’s solution – which is clearly more designed for agriculture than for growing urban 
areas – seems to also require price regulations and other state intervention in the market: 
“The leaseholders will be given certain securities for the stability of the 
economic factors upon which they base their offer, so that they cannot be 
crushed by their contract. This object could be achieved by the guarantee 
of minimum prices for agricultural products, the currency being adapted 
to these prices; or by reduction of the rent in case of a general rise of 
wages. In short, as the purpose of the reform is not to harass the farmer, 
but, on the contrary, to create and maintain a flourishing state of 
agriculture and a healthy farming class, everything possible will be done 
to bring the yield of the soil and farm-rent into permanent agreement.” 
(Gesell 1916, Part 2, Ch. 3) 
The location and improvements together determine the market value of any piece of real 
estate and you cannot really lease or buy a location without its fixed improvements. 
With no right to the income or capital of the thing and no incident of residuarity, there 
would be little incentive to improve land – especially in ways that don’t count as 
“construction”. Such actions might include removing large rocks and boulders to flatten 
it for construction, planting trees for future forestry gains in a more rural region, or 
finding better uses for the location or the natural resources on it (although Bryan 
Caplan’s (2012) example that a high land value tax would decrease incentives to search 
for oil might not be a very appealing argument in many environmentalists’ ears). 
Although the value of location is largely determined by what can be found around it, also 
the owner can affect location value, especially if he owns a larger area. Residuarity and 
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transmissability – i.e. that the real estate owner can keep a small part of the value of the 
location – together with some income from the location value give the owner every 
incentive to keep the location in as good a condition as possible and to ensure that his 
developments are beneficial for the value of the whole region. E.g. a large real estate 
developer might actually be inclined to build infrastructure and recreational areas on his 
own expense in order to increase the value of his other developments – not having to 
leave these completely on the responsibility of the municipality. This incentive for 
owners to maximize location value while keeping underusage unprofitable (together 
with the obvious room for corruption in public leases) is what makes a land value tax 
that appropriates a part of the location value of real estate (but not all of it) look like a 
much better solution than the public lease model. 
 36 
7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1 OPTIMAL LVT RATE 
In theory, taxation that fully appropriates land value would be the economically optimal 
solution, since the owner of the piece of real estate cannot impact this land value directly 
themselves. Land value can be considered and externality. 
However, we have concluded that in practice, objectively determining land value 
without a real-time market data seems to be an impossibility. For market prices to be 
formed, there needs to be some value left for private owners to valuate. Hence, a higher 
land value tax rate reduces the reliability of market-based valuation methods. 
Based on this assessment, the initial conclusion is that an optimal land value tax rate 
would appropriate 50-75 % of land rents to the state, leaving 25-50 % for the private 
owners. This reduces the volatility of real estate, and would provide significant source of 
public income while still providing fairly reliable market data for the purposes of 
determining land value fairly. Assuming a 5 % long-term discount rate on real estate 
investments on average, this would mean a 5 % to 15 % tax rate on the market value of 
land (location). Practice will show whether this proportion of land rent left to the market 
to value is sufficient for reliable determination for taxable value. 
In section 6.1, I speculated on future discount rates for real estate as low as -3 %, and 
concluded a minimum 5 % land value tax to be needed to prevent land values from 
turning highly volatile even at such discount rates. 
7.2 BEST PRACTICES FOR VALUATION 
Expert valuations are inevitably subject for bias and corruption, and when tens of 
thousands of euros in annual rental income as well as millions in real estate value are in 
question, the temptation and incentives for influencing such experts’ judgment becomes 
dangerously high. Hence also the monitoring and active regulation needed to weed out 
such corruption easily becomes very expensive. 
Hence, this these suggests determining taxable land value according to a clear formula 
which takes in mostly real market data (actual transactions and binding offers). 
In order to weed out outliers and “non-land properties” of individual buildings, such as 
brand value and the risk of hostile bids, this thesis recommends setting a cap for taxable 
value based on the statistical averages of land values in surrounding areas, e.g. limiting 
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deviations from the local norm to a maximum of e.g. 10 % and specific premiums 
attributed to individual buildings due to unique views, derived from the exact position 
and angle of a lot and how the construction permits of nearby lots limit such visibility.  
A majority of land value is based on accessibility (see section 4), which should change 
fairly continuously with e.g. distance from public transport hubs. 
The biggest challenge is that even within one apartment building, equally renovated 
apartments of similar size can have quite different market values due to e.g. different 
views, elevator access, or street noise. Some apartments might have different rules 
regarding how they can be renovated – and use rights are effectively part of location 
value. 
The suggested solution to avoid this issue is that public tax authorities determine taxable 
values for whole real estate companies (fin. “asunto-osakeyhtiö/kiinteistöosakeyhtiö”) 
only. It is then up to each real estate company to determine in their own rules how these 
tax responsibilities are split between the owners of individual apartment units or office 
space. This would allow room for private innovation in more fair ways to determine the 
differences in land value for apartments on different floors and with different views. Of 
course, recommended templates for such rule additions regarding tax burden allocation 
can be provided by the tax authorities, and some regulation has to exist that prevents e.g. 
minority shareholders in apartment companies from being robbed of their real estate 
value by the majority owners changing the tax allocation rules in the company against 
the will of the minority. The full challenges involved with such a system are hard to 
assess without practical experience of how real estate companies would do this in 
practice. 
 
7.3 MINIMALLY DISTORTIONARY ROLL-OUT 
METHODS 
7.3.1 Political and Economic Risks 
Involved in Real Estate Market Swings 
Valuations (net present value) of any financially valuable asset depend on the expected 
futures cash flow or other benefits that one can expect that asset to yield in the long run. 
Taxing the ownership of an asset (e.g. land value taxation) or its cash flows (e.g. land rent 
taxation) reduces the income it yields for the owner, and hence lowers its present value 
for the owner. In the case of e.g. a private enterprise, this does not need to be a long-term 
effect: If all competing companies are treated equally by the tax raise, this simply raises 
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the profit requirements of all companies in the market, and, as price competition 
slackens, the pre-tax profits can rise to compensate for the tax.  
However, this does not apply to monopoly resources, such as land. When there is no real 
competition and when the price elasticity of supply is non-existent, the price (in this case 
the land rent) is not determined by production costs and profit requirements, but almost 
purely by demand: what people and companies on the market are willing to pay for it. 
(Hulkko 2013) A tax directly cuts into the revenues yielded by the land. 
Hence, implementing a land value tax or raising it unpredictably can be expected to 
cause land values to fall sharply to correct for the change in expected revenue. This 
means unfair windfall losses to those who have just recently bought e.g. an apartment 
before the announcement of (or speculation on) such a tax raise. 
Moreover, in an economy where a very large bulk of overall debt is composed of 
mortgages taken by households, with real estate as the main collateral, sudden broad 
scale drops in real estate values poses a huge systemic risk on the financial solvency of 
the banking sector. In many countries, this level of mortgage lending is partly the result 
of public implicit and explicit subsidies on homeownership compared to living on rent.  
One could speculate that these subsidies are practically a symptom treatment for the 
income-difference-increasing effects of private land ownership. Instead of reducing the 
rents granted by real estate ownership, public policies have tried to give a bigger part of 
the population the chance to “join the landowning class”. With higher land value 
taxation, there should be less political pressure to support homeownership (which might 
also have other benefits to the economy such as increasing mobility). However, it might 
be necessary to cut down on homeownership subsidies already “upfront”, before the 
implementation of land value taxation, in order to start deleveraging the banking sector 
from high mortgage levels. This would be beneficial in any case: Even without a 
correction in valuations caused by a miscalculated land value tax rollout, real estate 
markets without land value taxation are volatile (increasingly so with low interest rates), 
and financial crises are almost inevitable. 
7.3.2 Compensating for the Effects of 
LVT by Removing Other Taxes 
A capital income tax that is paid on rental income but not imposed on the 
accommodation benefits owner-occupiers receive by living in their own house is 
effectively also such a subsidy on homeownership. To remove this subsidy, some have 
suggested taxing owner-occupiers similarly for the rent they pay themselves. However, it 
would be economically even more efficient to remove to replace such taxation directly 
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with land value taxation, instead of implementing a separate “correction tax”. On the 
other hand, removing capital income taxes from rents alone would likely raise real estate 
values. Combining the implementation of a land value tax with removing such other (less 
efficient) taxes on real estate and rents, can offset each others’ effects. Assuming a 
discount rate of 10 % for real estate, removing a 20 % capital income tax off rents would 
correspond to a 2 % tax on the valuation of the real estate. Assuming that, on average, 
approximately half of real estate value is land value, this would allow raising land value 
tax rate by 4 percentage points, and, in theory, real estate investors would, on average, 
not change their valuation of apartment investments. (Homeowners would of course not 
be willing to pay as much for their homes, which would effectively encourage a 
reduction in homeownership and a deleveraging of the mortgage burden in banking.) 
7.3.3 Possible Balancing Changes in 
Monetary Policy 
As discussed, interest rates are another significant factor influencing the value of 
perpetuities like land rents. Ceteris paribus, lower interest rates directly raise land 
valuations, as explained in section 6. In a perfect world, we would have an automatic 
interest rate mechanism, balancing aggregate supply and demand in an economy, and 
the risk-free market interest rate would finally be determined by (a) the market’s overall 
propensity to save and (b) the availability of profitable real investment opportunities. 
However, most Western economies’ monetary policies do not allow for this kind of 
balance. Due to standard ~2 % inflation targets, real interest rates effectively have a lower 
bound at -2 %. Even if the balance interest rate were lower, central banks’ mandates don’t 
allow pursuing such low real interest rates.  
Changing monetary policy to allow yet lower interest rates when they are needed (or 
possible without causing hyperinflation), would immediately change all investors’ 
expectations of long-term average interest rates significantly. Ceterlis paribus, this would 
likely cause a massive real estate bubble, which is one of the main arguments against 
“slack” or “loose” monetary policy, and why “macroprudential policy” tends to call for 
avoiding low interest rates even when the economy is clearly in a downturn and clear 
output gaps and deflation pressures exist. Correcting this major restriction of monetary 
policy simultaneously with implementing land value taxation would be a major 
opportunity: These are two problems that could solve each other. As explained under 
section 6, the land value tax rate and the risk-free interest rate both affect the valuation of 
location in exactly the same way (both raise the sum in the denominator of the valuation 
equation). Hence, a monetary policy change that is expected to lower long-term expected 
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average real interest rates by 2%-points would allow raising the LVT rate by 2 % points, 
and the effects of these changes should compensate for each other.  
There are also other factors that currently keep interest rates and hence discount rates 
higher than they would need to be. One such factor are the guarantees on bank deposits, 
which are currently provided in many countries by the public sector for free or at 
nominal costs significantly below their market value. Charging a proper price on this 
guarantee, would of course raise the premiums on bank loans (relative to deposit interest 
rates) accordingly, discouraging credit finance overall (further discouraging excess 
leverage in the economy). However, with no lower bound on interest rates, we could 
expect real deposit rates to be lower with a price on deposit guarantees than without 
such a prices.  
It is of course a challenging endeavor to determining exactly how much markets expect 
long-term interest rates to fall as a result of policy changes like the ones described above. 
Announcing exact raises in LVT together with such changes is at best enlightened 
guesswork, and a swing in real estate prices in one direction or the other is likely 
unavoidable. Some kind of feedback loop based on market prices, here too, could be 
implemented minimize unintended consequences. However, completely eliminating 
“political risks” of markets is impossible, especially with real estate prices that are 
affected by everything from monetary policy, to zoning, to public infrastructure 
investment, to the performance of local schools, to rental and construction regulations. 
One alternative is to make the LVT rate complementary to the central bank policy interest 
rate, so that the sum of the two remains a constant. It takes some research to determine 
whether this alternative would yield a less or more stable real estate market than a fixed-
rate LVT would. 
7.3.4 Gradual Implementation 
Apart from such opportunities to offset the valuation effects of land value taxation by 
implementing such other beneficial changes simultaneously, avoiding big swings in the 
market prices of real estate can be done by raising land value taxation gradually, at rates 
predicted to halt the rise in land values, but not cause a big, sudden correction.  
As all expected future cash flows affect valuation, even a promise to raise land value 
taxes in 10 years, should be reflected in real estate prices immediately, as long as it is 
credible. However, as long as discount rates remain positive, the change is smaller than a 
similar immediate raise. The challenge is making such long-term politics credibly and 
predictably with political power balances shifting every election year (every 4 years in 
many countries). Though this can maybe be done faster during overall economic upturns, 
 41 
the maxim of avoiding real estate market swings does set a strong limitation to 
implementing notable levels of real estate taxation (see section 7.1). 
7.3.5 Compensating for Losses (the 
State “Buying” the Land Value) 
If we conclude that we have to make such drastic changes that inevitably cause swings in 
real estate markets, then one feasible alternative for reducing net windfall losses is to 
compensate real estate owners for the losses they incur with a lump sum payment. 
As for alternative two, this would effectively mean that the state “buys” a part of the land 
value of real estate from private owners. It would be sensible to finance such a “force 
appropriation” of land value with further public debt, as it is effectively a very low-risk 
real state investment. Yes, the public “debt burden rises”, but on the other hand the 
government receives a long-term income source. If this income source were capitalized 
into the state’s balance sheet, state would not become significantly less solvent – possibly 
even more so. 
Just like the most efficient and objective way to determine taxable value is to use market 
data, similarly it seems sensible to use market data determine the compensation received 
by each real estate owner. Just like attempting to tax all land value eliminates the market 
data, a full compensation of the resulting drop in market value would make the 
assessment of that market value drop difficult. As a worst case scenario, all real estate 
owners might be incentivized to sell their real estate underpriced in order to get the 
maximal compensation. Hence, (a) the compensation would have to be partial, say 60-75 
% of the fall in the value of real estate, and (b) the compensations would have to be 
statistically balanced between nearby lots (just like the taxable values of individual pieces 
of real estate) in order to remove the incentive to make a deal with a acquaintance or 
family member to sell off a piece of real estate at a price below market value to maximize 
compensations. 
7.4 FURTHER RESEARCH NEEDED 
Given the potential socio-economic benefits of replacing transaction taxes (such as 
income taxes, value added taxes, and corporate taxes) to taxing monopoly resources like 
land value, we can conclude that the impacts of different types of land value taxation and 
the possible implementation alternatives are an unfortunately neglected field of research. 
One reason could be the lack of land tax implementations. However, this is a “chicken 
and egg problem”, and I would argue that developing better implementation alternatives 
and getting more exact data on the impacts of such taxes and their roll-out would are 
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required in order to facilitate serious societal discussion of more widespread adoption of 
heavier land value taxation systems. A lot of room for innovation remains. Hopefully this 
thesis can serve as a starting point, granting researchers and policy makers to a broader 
perspectives of the solution alternatives, as well as inspire further iteration of models and 
quantitative research and analysis. 
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